PROSPER

STARS
& STRIPES

April 24, 2025

Dear Investors,

During the first quarter of 2025, Prosper Stars & Stripes underperformed, generating a net return of -9.7% compared to a total return of -9.5% for the long-only small cap Russell 2000 Index (the "Russell")[i] , and a total return of 0.2% for the long/short equity hedge fund peer group represented by the HFRX Equity Hedge Index (the "HFRX")[ii].
Prosper Stars & Stripes is the UCITS Fund launched in May 2015 designed to run pari passu to the Roubaix Fund Composite (the Composite)[iii], launched in January 2010, where its long/short equity peer group is represented by the HFRI Equity Hedge (Total) Index (the "HFRI")[iv]. Average daily net exposure was 45.9% during the first quarter compared to a 43.6% average since inception in January 2010.

As of Mar. 31, 2025	Roubaix Composite[i]	HFRI Equity Hedge Index	Russell 2000 Index Tot Return
Quarter-to-Date	(9.70%)	(1.42%)	(9.48%)
Annualized 1 Year	(0.21%)	4.86%	(4.01%)
Annualized 3 Years	5.72%	4.98%	0.52%
Annualized 5 Years	12.37%	11.27%	13.27%
Annualized 10 Years	8.28%	5.97%	6.29%
Annualized Since Inception	9.36%	5.62%	9.43%
Standard Deviation	9.39%	8.32%	19.83%
Sharpe Ratio	0.87	0.55	0.49
Downside Deviation	5.13%	5.54%	13.03%
Sortino Ratio	1.60	0.82	0.75
Bull Beta to Benchmark		1.08	0.47
Bear Beta to Benchmark		0.10	0.12
Annualized Alpha to Benchmark		4.96%	5.10%

Historical results are not indicative of future performance.

The Composite underperformed relative to its net exposure to start the year. This was due to a combination of factors. On a market level, the Composite was positioned in anticipation of an improving set up for U.S. stocks due to an expectation of incoming pro-growth policies, an increase in business and consumer confidence, a cyclical recovery from several sectors that had been underperforming the economy for multiple years, and a view that small caps had a better opportunity to improve relative to the market. The Composite had moderately higher net exposure as well as more exposure to certain factors such as beta and momentum. These factors were drivers of weaker returns during the market's decline. The Composite also tends to be invested in the sectors where we believe stock picking is more rewarding such as Information Technology, Industrials, and Consumer Discretionary, all of which underperformed during the period. Lastly, several individual stock picks hurt performance without meaningful offsets. In response, we have made changes to the risk profile of the portfolio, while staying true to our investment philosophy.

ECONOMY

U.S. economic growth is less clear as we write this letter. Estimates are diverging with a downward trend. Just a few short months ago, a survey of economists conducted by the Federal Reserve (the "Fed") Bank of Philadelphia anticipated approximately 2.5% growth in real Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") for the U.S. in 2025.[1] As the quarter progressed, forecasts softened. The Atlanta Fed GDP publishes a forecast that is updated whenever economic data points in its model receive a fresh input. Ever since March, the Atlanta Fed GDP has forecasted a much weaker rate of growth, with the latest model projecting negative growth for the quarter. This portrays a drastic slowdown from the recent forecast of approximately 2.5% by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and a significant deceleration from the 2.8% growth in real GDP experienced in 2024.[2] Fluctuations in gold explain some of the variance, but even the gold adjusted model forecast a negative rate of growth in 2025. This and other data points emanating during the first quarter have led to more concern that a meaningful growth slowdown is underway. The forecast changes are not isolated to the U.S. With the U.S. being the world's leading economy, China, Europe and the rest of the world ("ROW") are all impacted if the U.S. grows at a slower rate and as U.S. trade policy impacts the export driven components of the global economy.





Atlanta Fed, GDPNow, JP Morgan, US Tariffs: What's The Impact on Global Trade and the Economy, April 11, 2025

Inflation moved in a more favorable direction during the first quarter. The March 12-month change rate on the all items index, released in April, demonstrated ongoing progress by falling to 2.4%, the lowest level recorded since 2021. This is welcome news for consumers who went through a strong dose of inflation in 2022 and 2023 and who dealt with lingering inflation in 2024. Some indicators suggest further declines in inflation will transpire. A frequently updated forecast from Truflation has seen inflation rates running under 2% for the end of the first quarter and trending at a similarly benign pace.[3] The 5 year, 5 year forward inflation expectation rate that is cited as a market-based estimate for future inflation has been stable since the start of the year. This likely reflects the risks of recessionary conditions offsetting the input costs risks from trade disruption. Imports of goods to the US economy is around 11% of GDP, making it a meaningful but

[1] Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, First Quarter Survey of Processional Forecasters, February 14, 2025
[2] BEA, Gross Domestic Product, 4th Quarter and Year 2024, March 27, 2025
[3] Truflation, Truflation US Inflation Index

manageable risk for the economy.[4] For the time being, we believe the benign trend in inflation has taken a back seat to other economic factors and uncertainties but may prove to be helpful to the economic cycle via lower interest rates later in the year.



CNBC, Here's The Inflation Breakdown for March, April 10, 2025, Truflation US Inflation Index

U.S. job growth continued in the first quarter. Job additions in March were 228,000.[5] For context, the U.S. added 2.23 million jobs in 2024 compared to 3 million in 2023 – a steady trend.[6] Initial jobless claims have held steady at levels seen in recent periods, suggesting stability in the labor market.[7] Wage growth has persisted and continues to outpace inflation. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate remains historically low, highlighting the overall strength of the job market.



St. Louis Fed, FRED https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation, April 4, 2025

Business and consumer sentiment were strong at the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025. The strength was credited to the anticipation that pro-business measures, such as reduced regulation, would encourage more mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"), while support for the financial sector would boost productivity and drive growth. We believed there were other reasons for optimism. Several key areas of the economy have been subdued in contrast to the better readings in GDP and the job markets. U.S. manufacturing has been in a tepid cycle of no growth for more than two years. Many parts of the Consumer Discretionary sector failed to recover from the boom-bust-cycle of the pandemic. Housing

[4] St. Louis Fed, Share of Gross Domestic Product: Imports of Goods
[5] Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation, April 4, 2025
[6] Reuters, US Labor Market Exits 2024 With Strong Job Gains, January 10, 2025
[7] Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims

turnover has remained extraordinarily low due to a similar dynamic combined with high home prices and high mortgage rates. The combination of a solid labor market, improving confidence, multiyear weakness in cyclical areas of the economy, and declining inflation suggested a good backdrop for improvement in 2025. This has shifted dramatically during the quarter due to international trade policy uncertainty.[8] CEOs on recent earnings calls and the April read on consumer confidence reflect negativity similar to past macro-economic crises.





[The Conference Board](), CEO Confidence Increased Sharply in Q1 2025, February 20, 2025, [Richmond Fed](), Optimism Among CFOs Falls Amid Concern About Tariffs, Uncertainty, March 26, 2025

The new administration wasted no time addressing the fiscal deficit. The U.S. has been running chronic deficits whether the economy has been in a recession or full employment. This is a structural issue that needs to be addressed in order to have a sustainable economy that can afford to pay for societal priorities and keep debt and interest expenses at manageable levels. The goal to reduce waste and fraud is a long standing and bipartisan goal albeit easier to discuss than to deliver actual spending reductions.[9] America's strength has been in its economy and wealth; while the backdrop is much different over time, fiscal strength is critical to be able to fund the goals of a country. Substantial growth in laws and regulations is another agreed upon burden to growth and productivity.[10] The main push so far has been a criticism of NGOs (non-governmental agencies) where some of the spending is either dubious or non-essential.[11] Otherwise, there has not been clear progress on the initiative to reduce regulation and burdensome laws, but this may take time and be more apparent later in the year.

Another pitch from the administration was reducing direct and indirect federal workforce labor and shifting workers into the private sector where productivity is higher. The federal workforce is approximately 3 million employees[12] and government contractors are estimated to be roughly twice the size. A 10% reduction in the federal workforce and contractors would likely be a change large enough to reduce job growth this year. The Department of Government Efficiency ("DOGE") launched with ambitious objectives, initially aiming to achieve savings of $1 trillion or more. Despite the apparent initial success, the results are running well short of the goal with only approximately $150 billion in spending cuts identified to date[13]. This is something to monitor as savings here are a tool to reduce the deficit and help other policy goals including lower taxes.

[8] Bloomberg, CEOs Haven't Been This Gloomy About the US Economy Since the Financial Crisis, April 22, 2025, CNN, US Consumer Sentiment Plummets to Second-Lowest Level on Record Going Back to 1952, April 11, 2025
[9] GAO, Fraud Risk Management: 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated $233 to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud, April 16, 2024
[10] Ohio Bar, Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law, February 20, 2025
[11] The Opinion Pages, If an NGO Can't Operate Without Taxpayer Money, Is It 'Non-Governmental,' April 15, 2025
[12] Pew Research Center, What the Data Says About Federal Workers, January 7, 2025
[13] Reuters, Musk Anticipates Savings of $150BN from DOGE in FY2026

Figure 1: Federal primary spending, revenues, and deficit under Bessent's plan



Sources: LSGE Workspace, Allianz Research

Figure 3: Federal spending by broad categories (USD trn, 2023)



Sources: LSGE Workspace, Allianz Research

Allianz, What to Watch: The 3-3-3 Secretary Bessent Paradox in the US, November 2024

The second focus has been the shaping of policies to reduce the chronic U.S. trade deficit. On April 2nd, shortly after the quarter ended, the announced tariff rates were far higher than even the most pessimistic forecasts had anticipated. While this could be part of a broader negotiation strategy, the administration has maintained that trade deficits are inherently unfair and that tariffs represent a significant potential revenue source for the government.[14] As it stands, the current tariffs would revert the U.S. to a protectionist policy that has not been seen for approximately 100 years. As a result, Policy uncertainty measures shot to near record highs – exceeding the anguish that occurred in past periods of panic. This uncertainty has defined the market ever since with large negative impacts on stock, bond and currency markets. While the situation could shift quickly due to its policy-driven nature, trade negotiations are inherently complex and often arduous. Goals to get deals done quickly may prove challenging for practical and political reasons.[15] Regardless of the exact outcome, businesses are likely to face increased costs – stemming from a combination of higher tariffs than what was present last year and from the need to make investments and adjustments to supply chains.[16]

Figure ES.1. US Effective Tariff Rates on All Imports
(Percent)





IMF, Global Growth Is Expected to Decline and Downside Risks to Intensify as Major Policy Shift Unfolds, St Louis Fed, Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index

One area where we are seeing the trade issues having an explicit impact is U.S. manufacturing. This sector has struggled on an industry basis since the pandemic and policy driven boom ended. Other sectors, including Consumer Discretionary, subsectors of health care, and housing have similarly struggled for different reasons to enter a sustainable upcycle. We believe one of the goals of the trade policy is to onshore manufacturing of key goods. U.S. manufacturing employment has declined consistently since the end of World War II ("WWII"). A large part of the decline is attributable to the natural evolution of an economy as they grow and mature and shift away from a reliance on industries such as agriculture and

[14] CNBC, CBP Says Latest Tariffs Have Generated $500 Million, Well Below Trump's Estimate, April 16, 2024
[15] Apollo, Trade Negotiations Take Time, April 20, 2025, noting it has taken 18 months on average to strike trade agreements.
[16] Bloomberg, Trump's Tariff Experiment is Making Americans Queasy Over Prices

manufacturing. As the global landscape has shifted and issues evolve, such as being able to supply the country with key medical supplies in a pandemic or the need to be able to produce key electronics for industry and for defense, the benefits of the outsourcing of production can turn into a strategic geopolitical weakness. A series of investment announcements have been made to produce more goods in the U.S., which we believe is a positive. On the other hand, we believe it is likely the investment needed will take years to have an impact, require a skilled and willing workforce, and certainly raise costs. Additionally, policy stability is required to afford business leaders' confidence that their investment today will not be negated by a policy change tomorrow. There is certainly a degree of activity that is occurring in building inventory to manage around the tariffs ahead of the changes. As a result, manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys show rising costs and weaker future demand, adding cyclical risks to the outlook.[17]

Market reactions since April 2nd have sparked worries among investors. The yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury—a key barometer for inflation expectations, the economic cycle, and investor appetite for U.S. debt—has become especially important in interpreting these developments. Following the announcement of new tariffs, there were instances when U.S. government bonds declined even on days typically associated with a flight to safety, an unusual pattern that was also accompanied by a weaker dollar. This combination has heightened concerns that investors may be broadly reducing their exposure to U.S. financial assets.[18] However, it is unlikely a sea change in something this complex can occur quickly.[19] Corporate bond spreads have widened during this sell-off from historically narrow levels and mind attention if they weaken further. There has also been pressure on global economic forecasts as tariffs catalyze slower growth as well as some potential geopolitical shifts. Most notably, Germany announced plans to end restrictive spending and run a large deficit in part to investment in rearmament. We believe the unfolding U.S. policy is driven by an attempt to raise revenues from trade and reduce China's global influence in a multipolar world that would have long term implications. How far this will reset remains to be seen. The costs of the policy shift seem outsized relative to the potential gain, and this may suggest a more reasonable outcome will find its way to the forefront. Furthermore, second order effects of these policies will continue to develop throughout the year. If the policies are as contractionary as feared, we believe it will eventually put downward pressure on global economies and interest rates.



St Louis Fed, ICE BofA High Yield Spread, St. Louis Fed, Market Yield on US Treasury Securities

[17] See the Dallas Fed, Philly Fed and Richmond Fed surveys of manufacturing and services all of which show sharply deteriorating trends and sentiment
[18] CNBC, Investors Are Growing Concerned About a US Asset Exodus as Treasurys and the Dollar Decline, April 12, 2025
[19] FT, Japan Investors Sold $20BN of Foreign Debt as Trump Tariffs Shook Markets, April 21, 2025, noting later 'The fall in US equities would have knocked Japanese pension funds' allocation to international debt and equity out of balance. As a result, fund would have been under pressure to sell Treasuries

MARKETS

The first quarter of 2025 marked a sharp reversal for U.S. equity markets after two years of robust gains. The quarter was especially challenging for small cap stocks, which significantly underperformed their large cap counterparts. The S&P 500, which had hit record highs in mid-February, ended the quarter down 4.2%, its worst quarterly performance since Q3 2022, amid heightened policy uncertainty, renewed trade wars, and concerns about economic growth. In our view, the correction in the quarter was triggered by a shift in investor sentiment, as optimism gave way to caution in the face of new tariff threats and a more volatile policy environment under the Trump administration.

Asset Class	Index	2024	Jan25	Feb25	Mar25	1Q25	1YR
Small Cap	Russell 2000	11.5%	2.6%	(5.3%)	(6.8%)	(9.5%)	(4.0%)
	Russell 2000 Growth	15.0%	3.2%	(6.7%)	(7.5%)	(11.1%)	(4.9%)
	Russell 2000 Value	7.6%	2.0%	(4.1%)	(6.0%)	(7.7%)	(3.2%)
Large Cap	S&P 500	25.0%	2.8%	(1.3%)	(5.6%)	(4.3%)	8.3%
	S&P 500 Equal Wgt	12.8%	3.4%	(0.7%)	(3.4%)	(0.7%)	3.9%
	S&P 500 Growth	36.0%	2.6%	(3.2%)	(8.1%)	(8.4%)	10.6%
	S&P 500 Value	12.2%	2.9%	(0.1%)	(3.0%)	0.2%	4.1%
	Nasdaq 100	25.6%	2.2%	(2.6%)	(7.6%)	(8.1%)	6.3%
Bonds	U.S. High Yield	7.4%	1.4%	0.9%	(1.1%)	1.2%	7.7%
	U.S. Aggregate	1.0%	0.5%	2.1%	(0.0%)	2.7%	4.9%
	U.S. Treasury	2.7%	(1.7%)	2.1%	0.2%	0.6%	4.3%
Blend	60% SPY/40% AGG	15.4%	1.9%	0.1%	(3.4%)	(1.5%)	6.9%

Source: Copyright © 2024, S&P Global Market Intelligence, Roubaix Capital, LLC

Within the Russell 2000 Index, there was a deteriorating trend throughout the quarter. After starting with a positive January, the index declined sharply in February and March. Sector performance within the Russell shows widespread weakness: the hardest hit sectors were Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Communication Services, and Industrials – all posting double-digit losses for the quarter. The Utilities sector was the only sector to post positive returns for the quarter, demonstrating a flight to defensiveness.

Russell 2000 Index Sectors	Weight	2024	Jan25	Feb25	Mar25	1Q25	1YR	vs. 52wk High	vs. 52wk Low
Consumer Discretionary	9.1%	6.7%	2.7%	(8.4%)	(9.5%)	(14.9%)	(14.0%)	(22.7%)	(1.1%)
Industrials	17.6%	17.0%	3.6%	(7.1%)	(7.5%)	(11.0%)	(4.2%)	(25.2%)	(4.4%)
Consumer Staples	3.2%	24.3%	3.4%	(1.8%)	(1.7%)	(0.2%)	18.8%	(21.5%)	6.4%
Information Technology	12.3%	21.9%	0.9%	(9.3%)	(9.6%)	(17.3%)	(10.6%)	(27.6%)	(7.4%)
Financials	19.7%	15.4%	3.2%	(1.2%)	(6.0%)	(4.2%)	12.2%	(25.6%)	2.1%
Materials	3.9%	3.1%	1.6%	(3.8%)	(4.5%)	(6.7%)	(7.9%)	(16.9%)	1.3%
Real Estate	6.4%	5.6%	0.0%	0.6%	(3.6%)	(3.0%)	4.4%	(16.9%)	3.4%
Health Care	16.7%	2.0%	5.2%	(5.9%)	(7.4%)	(8.4%)	(11.1%)	(14.9%)	3.1%
Communication Services	2.6%	12.3%	0.4%	(5.2%)	(7.5%)	(12.0%)	3.2%	(31.4%)	(6.1%)
Energy	5.1%	(2.6%)	(0.7%)	(9.5%)	(3.1%)	(12.9%)	(24.1%)	(14.1%)	14.8%
Utilities	3.2%	3.7%	0.1%	4.4%	0.8%	5.3%	13.2%	(10.2%)	7.1%
Russell 2000 Index	100.0%	11.5%	2.6%	(5.3%)	(6.8%)	(9.5%)	(4.0%)	(21.7%)	(2.6%)

Source: Novus, Copyright © 2024, S&P Global Market Intelligence, Roubaix Capital, LLC

LONG POSITION HIGHLIGHTS

Roubaix Fund Composite – Long Book

As of Mar. 31, 2025	Average Daily Exposure	Rate of Return	Gross Contribution	Net Contribution (v)	Active(v)	Passive(v)	Russell 2000 Index Total Return
Quarter-to-Date	92.81%	(14.79%)	(13.74%)	(13.89%)	(5.26%)	(8.73%)	(9.48%)
Annualized 1 Year	93.34%	(1.47%)	(1.55%)	(3.20%)	2.66%	(4.00%)	(4.01%)
Annualized 3 Years	87.44%	7.78%	4.91%	3.56%	5.21%	(0.18%)	0.52%
Annualized 5 Years	88.83%	25.16%	21.34%	18.85%	9.02%	11.93%	13.27%
Annualized 10 Years	86.34%	14.48%	12.53%	10.75%	6.42%	5.77%	6.30%
Annualized ITD	80.30%	17.53%	13.51%	12.36%	5.96%	7.21%	9.44%

Historical results are not indicative of future performance.

The Composite's long positions underperformed significantly during the first quarter and were impacted by weaker company-specific results, sector headwinds, and the broader underperformance of high beta stocks. The fund entered 2025 with a constructive view of the trend in growth that would sustain itself with cyclical recovery in parts of the economy that had not yet recovered, a view that de-regulation would be a benefit and that small caps would have a better chance to improve performance after a sustained period of underperformance. The fund's positioning reflected this in certain sector tendencies and factor characteristics such as beta and growth. These underperformed to start the year and in the absence of strong stock picking in the period, led to weaker than expected returns.

Talen Energy Corp. (TLN or "Talen") was the top contributor in the long book during the first quarter of 2025. Talen is an independent power producer ("IPP") with 10.7 gigawatts ("GW") of power producing assets in the 13 state mid-Atlantic region of the U.S. called the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland ("PJM") market. As mentioned in previous letters, the company's crown jewel asset is the 2.2 GW Susquehanna nuclear power plant. Talen signed a long-term power purchase agreement ("PPA") with Amazon Web Services ("AWS") for a total of 960 megawatts ("MW"). The first phase for up to 300 MW of power is in place; however, the additional phases are under review by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Given the demand for clean energy and artificial intelligence ("AI") datacenters, we believe a positive resolution is likely, as the dispute centers on interconnect costs and grid reliability. There are only 3.6 GW of new gas-fired generation projects expected to come online by 2030 in the PJM market. Based on management's demand forecasts, this is not enough capacity to meet the expected needs of the market. Talen reached an agreement to extend the lives of its reliability-must-run ("RMR") assets Brandon Shores and H.A. Wagner to the end of the decade rather than ceasing operations in May 2025. These assets will receive fixed payments totaling $180 million annually for the life of the contract. RMR assets are designed to ensure there are fewer or no blackouts when the grid is stressed. We believe the scarcity value of Talen's assets, financial stewardship of its balance sheet and cash flows, and equity valuation support our price target of approximately $300 per share.

Paycor HCM, Inc. (PYRC or "Paycor") was the second-best contributor in the long book during the first quarter of 2025. Paycor is a human capital management ("HCM") and payroll provider to small and medium businesses ("SMB"). The company enjoys real scale with over 30,000 clients and approximately 2.7 million employees on the platform. Paycor differentiates itself from peers by being an "open" platform: the software connects to 300 different integration partners.

Payroll is essential for any business and approximately half the addressable market uses in-house solutions or regional providers that do not have the breadth or depth of product offerings of a Paycor. We identified several ways to win with this investment, including expanding per employee per month ("PEPM") revenues via cross-selling, adding new clients, moving up market with larger deals, and finally pricing. We believed a renewed focus on profitable growth made Paycor a compelling long idea. Early in the year, Paycor was acquired by Paychex (PAYX) for $22.50 per share or 4.5x sales, which was in line with our estimate of fair market value. We exited our position shortly after the deal was announced.

Materialise NV (MTLS or "Materialise") was the largest detractor in the long book during the first quarter of 2025. Materialise has 3 segments: Manufacturing (~35% of FY24 revenues), Medical (~44%), and Software (~17%). All 3 businesses enable or use additive manufacturing ("AM") to deliver customized products to end customers. The company spoke enthusiastically about its prospects on their earnings call for the third quarter of 2024, and we believed this was an inflection point. The medical business has been growing far more than the market and at an impressive 30% operating profit margins. The head of the medical business had been promoted to CEO and the company expanded manufacturing substantially in the U.S. to meet growing demand. MTLS's medical business addresses Cranio-Maxillofacial ("CMF"), a surgical specialty that focuses mainly on trauma. Personalized solutions are far better in our view compared to the existing treatments that require doctors to manually adjust by bending implants to a patient's facial structure. Unfortunately, after the bullish tone in the 3rd quarter, the company's manufacturing business had disappointing results in Q4 and missed substantially. The manufacturing business sales declined 3% with negative 1.6% operating margins. Our post-call conversations with management and another reference did not offer reassurance on a strategy to aggressively invest in Medical and downsize Manufacturing. Without a clear line of sight to a recovery, we exited the long positioning respecting our stop loss discipline.

SHORT POSITION HIGHLIGHTS

Roubaix Fund Composite – Short Book

As of Mar. 31, 2025	Average Daily Exposure	Rate of Return	Gross Contribution	Net Contribution(v)	Active(v)	Passive(v)	Russell 2000 Index Total Return
Quarter-to-Date	(46.90%)	(9.55%)	4.48%	4.38%	0.03%	3.96%	(9.48%)
Annualized 1 Year	(44.36%)	(4.96%)	2.18%	1.18%	0.08%	(0.05%)	(4.01%)
Annualized 3 Years	(43.22%)	(2.49%)	0.44%	(0.22%)	0.45%	(1.82%)	0.52%
Annualized 5 Years	(44.18%)	12.30%	(6.78%)	(7.75%)	(0.72%)	(6.97%)	13.27%
Annualized 10 Years	(43.02%)	3.75%	(3.32%)	(4.16%)	0.09%	(3.75%)	6.30%
Annualized ITD	(36.67%)	5.06%	(2.64%)	(3.24%)	0.74%	(3.54%)	9.44%

Historical results are not indicative of future performance.

The best performing short position in the first quarter of 2025 was Fortrea Holdings, Inc. (FTRE or "Fortrea"). Fortrea is a contract research organization ("CRO") or a company that helps design and execute clinical trials for pharmaceutical and biotechnology customers. The company was spun-out of LabCorp (LH) in mid-2023 and was not set up for success in our view. We have observed spin outs where the new company is saddled with high debt and a need to increase investment. FTRE trailed its peers in key metrics such as revenue per full-time employee ("FTE"), return on research & development ("R&D"), and operating margins. In fact, the company's margins were 50% below other leading CROs. In addition, we believed the new management team made overly optimistic assumptions about future projections. When FTRE reported Q4 2024 results in early 2025, the company guided for -7% top-line growth and 7.5% EBITDA margins in

FY25, far below the original expectations of positive top-line growth and double-digit EBITDA margins. Further, Fortrea's net leverage ratio reached 5.1x leaving very little financial or operational flexibility. We closed our short position after the decline in the stock price.

Flywire Corp. (FLYW) was the second-best contributor in the short book during the first quarter of 2025. Flywire is a payment platform that makes it easier for consumers and businesses to send and receive money across countries, especially for specific industries like education (e.g., paying tuition fees) and travel (e.g., booking accommodations). We have been skeptical of the value-added service of the company and were aware that international travel and student visas were seeing pressure from markets, including Canada and Australia. These challenges caused a significant reduction in guidance for FY25 reported on the company's Q4 2025 call in early 2025. Management guided for 10 to 14% constant currency top-line growth compared to the expected 20%+. Further, uncertainty around student visas in the U.S. also caused management to take a more cautionary tone to their 2025 outlook. We closed our short shortly after quarter-end, as we believed the short thesis had played out in the near term.

American Superconductor Corp. (AMSC) was the largest detractor in the short book during the first quarter of 2025. The company is a system provider of megawatt-scale power resiliency solutions for the power grid, torpedo defense for the Navy, and components for the India wind market. This is an eclectic assortment of businesses with little relation to each other despite steps taken to simplify the company in the past. Further, we were unable to establish a compelling narrative on the market position or performance quality of the company products. Despite using terms like "smart materials" and "smart software and controls," AMSC's financial profile is decidedly much more pedestrian than proprietary in our view. In FY24, gross margins were 27-28% and the average between 2017 to 2022 was approximately 15%. Operating margins in FY24 were -1% and between 2017 to 2022, EBIT margins were deeply negative. This history of lack of profits meant AMSC needed to consistently raise capital, which is illustrated via its shares outstanding jumping from 17 million in 2017 to 38 million in 2024. The shares rallied sharply on a quarterly report and outlook that exceeded expectations. Following our stop-loss process, we closed out the position during the quarter.

OUTLOOK

EARNINGS, VALUATIONS, AND CYCLES

2025 started with earnings forecasted to grow 10%+ for large caps. Small caps were expected to grow at a higher rate since cyclical areas of the economy were expected to improve and small cap earnings had an easier base to grow after several years of underperformance.[20] As the earnings season gets underway in April, estimates softened but are still expected to grow. The decline in estimates by mid-April was not significant and tracked the negative revisions seen in a typical year. However, the unpredictable changes in policy are likely to have an impact on businesses and consumers. We have seen initial signs of weakness developing in travel & leisure and transportation and we believe this will broaden into other areas of the economy. Higher costs from tariffs and/or the need to restructure supply chains create quantifiable costs for businesses. While consumers have been strong to date, job losses are likely to increase due to government spending cuts and corporate hiring caution. Higher costs of products will raise prices and reduce demand resulting in earnings pressure. Earnings recessions do not have to be severe, but we believe estimates will need to fall approximately 10% to take profit estimates close to zero and this seems like a likely path. The median profit recession historically lasts approximately 4 quarters and has resulted in approximately 10% profit decline.[21]

[20] JP Morgan Asset Management, Guide to the Markets, March 31, 2025, see page 13 'Small caps, mid caps and large caps
[21] GS, US Equity Views – The Recession Manual for US Equities, May 18, 2022



Piper Sandler, Why Are Small Caps Struggling to Find Their Footing, April 15, 2025, [Nasdaq](), A Closer Look at Earnings Expectations for Q1 & Full-Year 2025

Valuations have improved during the market correction. As noted, estimates have not declined much as we believe company reports and outlooks have not adjusted to the more challenging business environment. Multiples for the S&P 500 have compressed from a clear premium to something that is towards the high end of historical averages. Small Cap valuations are more difficult to broadly comment on given the mix of unprofitable stocks in the Russell is approximately 40%. The S&P 600, which eliminates money losing companies, suggest valuations of small caps are attractive relative to large and moderately attractive compared to longer-term averages. The poor performance of small caps to large caps, which has been extreme, widened yet again. While this reflects fundamental differences, including better earnings growth of large caps versus small caps, these measures tend to reverse, and we believe it ought to provide a tailwind to small caps at some point in the future.





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Equity market declines are not uncommon – 15% drawdowns are typical in a year. Small cap stocks have declined more, entering a bear market with a peak to trough decline just shy of 30%. Large caps entered a modest bear market as they declined approximately 22%. Bear markets have been more severe when associated with a recession, hence the economic cycle is an important variable for the rest of the year. The tariff policy, as it stands, is disruptive to trade, increases costs, and is likely to reduce demand. Without a material change from where the trade war stands, there is a real risk of a policy-induced recession. Policy is subject to rapid shifts, especially under the current administration where information often comes without warning. As the trade war has progressed, the severity – dare say absurdity - of the U.S. stance indicates to us that the outcome is likely to be less drastic than what was initially announced on April 2nd and raised shortly after. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear articulation of practical objectives remains troubling. The most logical aims appear to be boosting domestic manufacturing in critical sectors and strengthening as well as securing domestic supply chains in areas such as technology, essential healthcare supplies, and key components for the defense industry.

S&P intra-year declines vs. calendar year returns

Despite average intra-year drops of 14.1%, annual returns were positive in 34 of 45 years



Exhibit 4: S&P 500 has contracted 24% from peak to trough around the median recession since WWII



Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

me, Guide to the Markets, March 31, 2025, GS, US Equity Views – The Recession Manual for US Equities, May 18, 2022

With the above factors in mind, the Composite strives to use periods of market dislocation to reinvest in some of the high-quality stocks that we monitor on our focus list for attractive entry points. One such stock is Repligen Corp (RGEN or "Repligen"). The company is a global supplier of hardware and consumables to pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and contract drug manufacturing organizations ("CDMOs"). Repligen is a "picks & shovels" provider of essential tools to the life sciences industry; approximately 80% of the products it sells are consumables. The bioprocessing industry historically grows consistently between 8-12% per year. Repligen is seen as an innovator across key areas of the upstream and downstream value chain in drug development, and we believe approximately 80% of the company's portfolio has little to no real competition. Since the consumables it sells typically represent less than 5% of the total cost to manufacture a biologic, Repligen enjoys strong pricing power. The life science tools ("LST") industry experienced several headwinds over the past two years from post-COVID de-stocking and slowing sales in China. However, more recently, there have been green shoots as Repligen's pharma and consumable orders have increased mid-to-high teens. In addition, there were near-record 64 new drug approvals in 2024. The post-COVID hangover appears to be coming to an end; we believe Repligen's sales can accelerate to 15+% in 2025. We believe this growth would be accompanied by at least 100 basis points ("bps") of margin expansion and strong free cash flow. Recent reports from peers including Danaher and Satorius support the view that trends are improving. Further, the desire to add domestic capacity for drug manufacturing is a medium to long term catalyst that will support growth rates. Repligen has high visibility and accelerating revenues and profits and we anticipate meaningful upside to ~$180 price based on a 10x EV/S multiple.

Another structurally strong industry the Composite has consistently invested in is the aerospace aftermarket ("AM"), particularly engine maintenance, repair, and overall ("MRO") services. We believe the aerospace engine AM has significant barriers to entry. MRO services are highly specialized requiring expensive infrastructure, tooling, and skilled engineering. MRO operations also benefit from regulatory oversight that require extensive approvals and certifications from regulators and original equipment manufacturers ("OEM"). Lastly, engines require mandatory, regular "shop visits" in addition to unscheduled maintenance that leads to predictable revenue streams. StandardAero, Inc. (SARO or "StandardAero") is the world's largest independent, pure-play provider of aerospace engine aftermarket services. The company has a privileged position in the most profitable segment of aerospace AM, holding #1 or #2 positions on approximately 80% of its engine service platforms. Approximately 77% of sales are delivered via long-term contracts, creating recurring-like revenue. The aerospace industry has consistently grown above GDP with air traffic growing at 5.6% CAGR over the last 40 years, including over the last decade. StandardAero's competitive advantage is a combination of global scale, service capabilities, OEM alignment, and reputation in a highly regulated industry. We believe the company is likely to sustain the plus-or-minus 10% top-line growth reported over the last couple of years. This is due to its ability to service the CFM-56 engine platform, the largest engine platform in the world with 19,000 serviceable engines in circulation, as well as its branded service agreement ("CBSA") with CFM International for the LEAP engine platform making StandardAero the only independent AM service provider in North America. There are expected to be 33,000 LEAP engines in service by 2033. The company has steadily improved margins and strong free cash flow. Since air traffic has only experienced declines 5 times (never in consecutive years) from 1978 through 2023, we like the defensive growth characteristics that StandardAero provides. We believe the company is worth $35 per share at a 15x EV/EBITDA multiple.

The Composite has a number of other long investments that seek to take advantage of the current backdrop and has increased its mix of longs with defensive characteristics. For example, Americold Realty Trust, Inc (COLD) is a real estate investment trust ("REIT") that leases space for fresh food commerce. We believe this business to be resilient in general and to benefit from trends towards healthier eating. We believe the management changes that were made are having a positive impact on the business. The Composite has also invested is several defense stocks that will benefit from stability in overall defense spending and the shifting priorities that emphasize the navy and modernizing weapon systems. As an example, Karman Holdings Inc (KRMN) is a supplier of subsystems for space and launch applications, missiles, and hypersonic weapons. The company expects revenues to grow over 24% in 2025 and to deliver over 30% EBITDA margins.[22] We believe this is one of the ways to invest in the need to modernize the US defense industry. We also continue to identify stocks with corporate change. A recent example is TriMas Corp (TRS). TRS has signaled they are considering asset sales to align focus in the business. Management and board changes as well as insider buying signal conviction is behind these changes and we believe the actions have potential to unlock value in 2025. Lastly, changing global supply chains will benefit certain companies. Two examples of this are Xometry Inc (XMTR) and Kornit Digital Ltd (KRNT). XMTR runs a localized marketplace for customized parts and production matching user's needs with local production. KRNT's printing machines allow for localized textile production. We believe both businesses ought to benefit from the rapidly changing trade backdrop and that both have unique business models with strong, scalable financial profiles.

The changes and disruptions in the economy also created short opportunities. After a period of above average growth, we believe leisure spending is likely to come under some pressure. One example that we see particular risk in is Ryman Hospitality Properties Inc ("RHP"). RHP builds large hotels that cater to businesses and vacations. We have seen corporate spending come under pressure, and we believe this will result in weaker forward bookings when the company reports on its first quarter. Additionally, it is our view that the rapidly changing supply chains are going to put upward pressure on costs for companies that source overseas and sell in America. We see exposure to this in Helen of Troy Ltd (HELE). HELE has a significant amount of supply coming from China, and we believe its competitive end markets will make for a difficult situation if prices start to rise. Additionally, we continue to see pressure on consulting firms due to the combination of expense reductions from the government and corporations, given the uncertain outlook, along with longer term questions on the value of consulting as artificial intelligence ("AI") tools continue to improve. An example of a company we see at risk is Insight Enterprises Inc (NSIT). NSIT implements hardware and software and has already seen top line pressure develop before the marked increase that occurred this quarter. We believe incremental headwinds will weigh on the stock when they report their first quarter and provide an update to their 2025 outlook.

The markets have a higher degree of macro uncertainty than usual. This affords the Composite opportunities as well as risks to manage. We continue to revisit and invest in the companies that we see as having the tools and drivers to manage through this backdrop. We believe market volatility to be a reality and to put pressure on "weak links", which we believe is expressed in our short book. We also believe companies will dynamically manage the changing trade and economic landscape to seek ways to grow profits through the trade war and recession risks. There is a sequence of events to be

[22] Karman Space & Defense, Full Year Earnings Conference Call, April 8, 2025

mindful of in the near term. In our view, the turbulence to business conditions will run its course, and we believe many companies will be able to compound value for company specific and cyclical reasons as we progress through 2025.

INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

We believe the most important drivers of equity value over time are the strength or weakness of a company's business model, the advantages or challenges created by their financial structure, and the quality of the fiduciaries involved. We identify what we believe are the best long and short narratives in the small and mid-cap universe of U.S. stocks and track them on a focus list. Our list is dynamic as we evaluate new companies entering our market cap range due to price changes, IPOs, spin-offs and other corporate developments. Likewise, we eliminate stocks from our focus list when the long thesis plays out and they become too large for our approach, or if the short thesis drives the stock price to a level at which it transforms into a special situation with vastly decreased liquidity and/or increased price volatility. Base, bull and bear case price targets are derived from two year forward valuations, while also considering longer term trends discounted back appropriately. We deploy capital when these differentiated narratives present themselves with a compelling risk/reward profile compared to other stocks in our portfolio.

We concentrate our efforts on smaller companies due to their inherent structural inefficiencies that drive greater price dispersion, in turn enabling higher alpha generation on both longs and shorts. The investment landscape continues its trend of consolidating investment management and advice at ever larger financial institutions. The cost benefit of increased scale has an inverse effect on the ability of investment managers to buy and sell smaller stocks when considering reasonable liquidity parameters. Further, the rapid growth in passive and quantitative investing is reducing the amount of competition from fundamentally driven active stock pickers overall. As an increasing share of daily trading volume shifts to passive from active mandates, there is even less economic benefit to sell side equity research. This in turn reduces the amount of published information, particularly in smaller stocks with lower trading volume. Importantly, we think these inefficiencies are not just persistent, but should move even more in our favor over time.

Smaller companies are likely to remain a reliable source of mispriced investment opportunities that are either overlooked or are not practical investments for larger firms. We believe our structured fundamental investment process allows us to uncover such unique ideas and generate value through stock selection on both long and short investments. We tend to concentrate individual stock positions in 30-50 longs and 30-50 shorts to maximize the value of our research, and likewise do not utilize ETFs or options to hedge. Position level weights are optimized for exposure to changing fundamental factors, catalysts and risks. To manage overall portfolio risk, we avoid leverage on the long side, maintain consistent net exposure, and remain disciplined with our price targets and stop-loss levels. We believe our strategy is amongst the leaders in small cap long/short equity with a decade of compelling net returns, low volatility, and consistent capital preservation in weak markets.

Thank you for your ongoing support,

Christopher E. Hillary

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

This letter is intended for current and prospective accredited investors and is not for public distribution. The information contained herein reflects the opinions, projections, and holdings of Roubaix Capital, LLC ("Roubaix") as of the date of publication, which are subject to change without notice at any time after the date of issue. Roubaix does not represent that any opinion or projection will be realized. All information provided is for informational purposes only and should not be deemed as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase or sell any specific security. While the information presented herein is believed to be reliable no representation or warranty is made concerning the accuracy of any data presented. This communication is confidential and may not be reproduced.

All figures are unaudited. These figures are based on estimates. Estimates are subject to change. Historical results are not indicative of future performance.

i. The Russell 2000 Total Return Index is Russell Investments' Composite Index of 2000 small-cap stocks, a widely recognized, unmanaged index of common stock prices. The benchmark index may or may not hold substantially similar securities to those held by the Composite, and thus little correlation may exist between the Composite returns and that of the Index. The Index is not available for direct investments; therefore, its performance does not reflect the expenses associated with active management of an actual portfolio. The return for the Index includes gross dividends reinvested into the index.
ii. HFRX Equity Hedge Index : Equity Hedge strategies maintain positions both long and short in primarily equity and equity derivative securities. A wide variety of investment processes can be employed to arrive at an investment decision, including both quantitative and fundamental techniques; strategies can be broadly diversified or narrowly focused on specific sectors and can range broadly in terms of levels of net exposure, leverage employed, holding period, concentrations of market capitalizations and valuation ranges of typical portfolios. Equity Hedge managers would typically maintain at least 50%, and may in some cases be substantially entirely invested in equities, both long and short. Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR) utilizes a UCITSIII compliant methodology to construct the HFRX Hedge Fund Indices. HFRX Equity Hedge Index is rebalanced on a quarterly basis and is composed of funds that have at least USD 50 million under management and have been actively trading for at least twenty-four months.
iii. The performance referenced in this letter shows the historical performance of the Roubaix Fund Composite (the "Composite") unless otherwise noted. The accounts in the Composite have investment objectives, policies, and strategies that are substantially similar. The Composite was composed of the Roubaix Fund, L.P. ("Roubaix Fund") and another pooled investment vehicle from 2010 to February 29, 2020 and is presently composed of the Roubaix Fund and Roubaix Offshore Fund, Ltd. ("Offshore Fund") since February 1, 2022. Accounts contained in the Composite are actively managed and characteristics may vary. Net performance for the typical investor reflects the deduction of 1.15% annual management fee, 15% annual incentive allocation, and other expenses and includes gross dividends and other income reinvested in the portfolio. Net performance figures reflect the performance of a typical investor in the portfolio who invested at the beginning of the period and remained invested throughout the period. The performance of an individual investor may vary based upon various investor-specific factors including, without limitation, the investor's eligibility to participate in new issues. Advisory fees are deducted monthly while incentive fees are deducted annually and over time each will reduce the net return on a compounded basis. A fee schedule can be found on Form ADV, Part 2A for Roubaix Capital, LLC. On October 1, 2015, Roubaix replaced Independence Capital Asset Partners, LLC as General Partner to Roubaix Fund, L.P. (formerly Independence Capital Small Cap Fund LP) and as investment manager of the separate account, both of which historically comprised the Composite. The management, investment objective and strategy of the Composite has remained substantially the same since the Composite's inception on January 1, 2010.
iv. The HFRI Equity Hedge (Total) Index tracks funds that maintain positions both long and short in primarily equity and equity derivative securities. Equity hedge managers would typically maintain at least 50% exposure, and may in some cases be entirely invested in, equities-both long and short. HFRI Equity Hedge (Total) is a fund-weighted index and reflects monthly returns, net of all fees, of funds that have at least $50 million under management or have been actively trading for at least twelve months. The Index is not available for direct investment.
v. Roubaix utilizes Novus for portfolio attribution. The Novus Framework decomposes contribution into four factors: market (contribution attributable to market benchmark), category (contribution attributable to the specific sector benchmark), security (contribution attributable to stock selection), and trading (contribution attributable to position liquidation). Within the Novus Framework, we define "Passive Contribution" as equivalent to Market contribution, which is synonymous with 'Beta' to the relevant portfolio benchmark. We define "Active Contribution" as equivalent to Security + Trading + Category contribution, which

is synonymous with portfolio manager 'Alpha'. Definitions of additional attribution terms discussed in this letter can be found in the pitch book for the Roubaix Strategy, which has preceded or accompanied this letter, or are available upon request. The net contribution for the Longs and Shorts were converted to account for fees and expenses. The methodology for this Gross-to-Net conversion involves dollarizing the difference between Gross and Net returns using AUM for that month. The Gross exposure is then normalized down to 100%, and the dollarized net fees are allocated pro rata by subcategory size, i.e., Long/ Short and Sector. Importantly, the summation of subcategory net returns may differ to the Fund- level net return due to mathematical differences in subcategory compounding.

More frequent performance information is available upon request.